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Have the Sons Disobeyed their Fathers? The Massachusetts' Standing
Analysis after Biological Diversity
Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. UnitedStates Department ofInterior'
I. INTRODUCTION

In his famous dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglas
stated that "[c]ontemporary public concern for protecting nature's
ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation." 2 The spirit of
his intention, that citizens had standing to bring suit on behalf of animals,
fish, and even the Earth, spurred environmental litigants to bring suit
against the federal government when its action would likely result in
environmental harm. But from Morton until Massachusetts v. EPA, a key

component to standing requirements, that the particular plaintiff must be
injured, and not just the environment, prevented litigants from bringing
suits solely to protect environmental objects. 3 With the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts environmental litigants argued that a new era of
standing analysis had arrived.4 Where previously hostility towards claims
of a generalized climate change injury barred litigants from the courtroom
door, Massachusetts signaled that this proposition was no longer true.
However, the D.C. Circuit's decision in BiologicalDiversity casted doubt
as to whether a "generally shared" climate change injury could withstand a
standing analysis and even what, if anything, Massachusetts added to the

563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3See id. at 742-43; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Notable exceptions to
the general prohibition on standing suits that involve general injury are United States v.
2 Sierra

Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) and
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
4 For a discussion concerning what scholars thought Massachusettsmeant to standing
analysis, see Jonathan K. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L.
REV. INBRIEF 63 passim (2007) and Jonathon Z. Cannon, The Significance of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. INBRIEF 53 passim (2007).
5 Adler, supra note 4; Cannon, supra note 4.
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traditional standing analysis. 6
Due to the importance of the standing analysis, in that courts must
resolve jurisdictional questions such as standing before proceeding to the
merits of a case, standing is the most important legal principle discussed in
Biological Diversity.7 This note will examine the standing analysis in
Massachusetts and BiologicalDiversity in order to present a discussion of
a climate change litigant's standing requirements post Biological
Diversity. Specifically, two issues will be addressed. First, Biological
Diversity distinguished itself from Massachusetts, which subsequently
limited the scope of the Massachusetts' standing analysis. This note will
discuss whether or not this distinction is legitimate. Second, Biological
Diversity's discussion of a generally shared injury and an alleged injury
determined the court's substantive standing holding. This note will
examine how the majority opinion decided these issues and whether or not
the analysis was consistent with standing jurisprudence.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In August 2005, the United States Department of the Interior
(hereinafter "Interior") began the process of expanding its leases on the
Outer Continental Shelf region (hereinafter "OCS") off the coast of Alaska
from 2007 to 2012. The Leasing Program's particular details included an
expansion of previous leases in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas. 9
6 See

Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 563 F.3d at 475-77. The quotations around generally
shared are purposeful to show that this term is pliable at best and untenable at worst. The
use of a "generally shared" injury standard has, from time to time, arguably served as a
mechanism to bar environmental litigants from the court house door, rather than serve as
a legitimate constitutional requirement. In discussing the traditional standing analysis,
this note is referring to the modem standing analysis articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
7 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-93 (1998).
8 Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 471. The Leasing Program's purpose is to
lease offshore oil and gas developments. Id. at 472. Per 43 U.S.C. § 1344, the Leasing
Program is created by preparing a five-year schedule of proposed lease sales in the area
in question. Id. at 473. The general area in the Outer Continental Shelf is the submerged
land in the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas. Id. at 471.
9
Id.
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The Program's "Proposed Final Plan" was published in April 2007 for the
approval stage, scheduling twenty-one potential lease-sales between July
2007 and June 2012 in eight areas total, four of which are in the seas in
question in the OCS.' 0
In seeking review, the Petitioners argued that the Leasing Program
violated portions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (hereinafter
"OCSLA"), the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA"),
and the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA").11 The Petitioners,
three non-profit environmental activist groups and a federally recognized
tribal government, the town of New Hope, were seeking to protect the
OCS areas.12 Specifically, the Petitioners advanced four arguments.' 3
First, the Petitioners argued that the Leasing Program violates both
OCSLA and NEPA because Interior failed to take into consideration the
Leasing Program's effects on climate change generally and climate change
in the OCS area in particular.1 4 Second, the Petitioners contended that the
Leasing Program violates OCSLA and NEPA because Interior approved
the Program without conducting sufficient biological baseline research for
the OCS sea area in question.' 5 Also, the Petitioners claimed that the
Program did not provide a research plan showing how baseline data would
be obtained before the next stage of the Leasing Program.' 6 Third, the
Petitioners contended Interior violated ESA by failing to first consult with
10

Id. at 475. The Proposed plan was submitted to Congress and the President of the
United States after it was published. Id. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior
the plan. Id.
approved
at
471-72.
Id.
12
Id. at 472. The three non-profit activist organizations were the Center for Biological
Diversity, the Alaska Wilderness League and the Pacific Environment. Id. The
organizations work to protect the water and living environments off the coast of Alaska.
Id. The Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska, is a federally recognized tribal
government that uses a sea that is part of the OCS region, the Chukchi Sea, to gather and
hunt food. Id.
" See id. at 471-42.
14 Id. at 471 (citing The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a
(2006) and The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4312-4370f
(2006)).
" Id. at 471-72.
16
Id. at 472.
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either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries
Service about potential harm to the endangered species in the OCS area
before adopting the Leasing Program.17 Finally, the Petitioners advanced
the argument that "the Leasing Program violate[d] OCSLA because it
irrationally relied on an insufficient study by the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration in assessin
the environmental
sensitivity of the OCS planning areas" in question.
The court held that the Petitioner's NEPA and ESA claims were
not ripe for review. 19 Additionally, of the three OCSLA claims, the
OCSLA climate change and baseline data challenge claims lacked merit
and thus failed.20 However, the court ruled that the OCSLA claim
involving the environmental sensitivity rankings had merit. 2 1 The court
vacated the Leasing Program and remanded the case for reconsideration
before the Interior Secretary. 22
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. OCSLA Requirements
OCSLA establishes a procedural framework when Interior leases
areas of the OCS in order to explore and develop oil and gas deposits.23
The framework is a pyramidic, four-step process starting with broad-based
planning and subsequently narrowing the focus to actual development
once it becomes imminent. 24 The first step involves the creation of the
five-year scheduled Leasing Program and the subsequent comment and
approval period.2 5 Interior is required to ensure the Program considers the
7

Id. (citing The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006)).

18Id.
2190 Id.

d

21 id.
22 id.
23

Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337 (2006)).
Id. at 473 (citing California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
25 Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S.
312, 337 (1984).
24
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economic, environmental, and social values of renewable and
The Leasing Program is examined to
nonrenewable resources. 26
determine the potential impact that oil and gas exploration has on the
27
Interior
OCS, along with marine, coastal, and human environments.
must consider additional factors such as a region's existing geographical,
geological, and ecological characteristics.28 Additionally, Interior must
consider an analysis of the developmental benefits and environmental
risks, the environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of the OCS,
and the environmental and predictive information for different areas of the
OCS. 29 Finally, Interior must ensure that the lease obtains a balance
between the potential for environmental damage and the potential for
30
discovery of oil and gas.30
Second, bids are solicited and subsequent leases are issued. 3 '
During the second step, the lease purchasers who were issued a lease only
have the right to conduct preliminary activities and cannot penetrate the
seabed by more than 300 feet. 32 The preliminary activities and seabed
penetration cannot result in any significant environmental impacts. 33
During the third step, Interior reviews the plan. The plan can proceed to
the fourth step only if it "will not be unduly harmful to aquatic life in the
area, result in pollution, create hazardous or unsafe conditions,
unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or disturb any site,
structure, or object of historical or archeological significance." 3 4 The
fourth step is the development and production phase. It involves an
See Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 563 F.3d at 473.
Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)). Section 20 of the OCSLA provides that when the first
lease is given in an area, the Secretary conducts studies to establish the environmental
information necessary to provide time-series and data trend information. 43 U.S.C. §
21346(b).
8
26
27

id

29 Id. (citing

43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)).
Id. at 474 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3)).
31 Id. at 473 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)).
32 Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 338-39 (1984) (citing 30 C.F.R. §
250.34-1 (1982)).
33
Id. at 339.
34 Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 563 F.3d at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1340 (g)(3)).
30
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additional review of the detailed plan. Interior determines whether or not
the plan would be likely to cause serious harm or damage to the marine,
coastal, or human environment. 3 5 The structure of moving from the broad
to the narrow prevents premature litigation, as adverse environmental
effects occur during the later stages of the process.36
B. NEPA Requirements

NEPA's requirements are procedural in nature to ensure
consideration of environmental impacts in order to work toward the goal
of environmental protection and an informed decision.3 7 Therefore, the
statute requires an agency to do two things. First, an agency must assess
the environmental consequences of major federal actions, such as leasing
the OCS space, by following certain procedures during the decision
making process.38
Second, an agency must prepare a detailed
environmental impact statement before approving a particular project.3 9
When a pyramid program is at issue, an agency allows a tiered approach.4 0
This occurs when an environmental impact statement is prepared that
starts broader and subsequently becomes more detailed as the program
advances through the steps. 4 1
C. ESA Requirements

Under ESA, a federal agency is required to ensure that a
government action, such as a Leasing Program, is not likely to jeopardize
an endangered species and is not likely to cause damage to the critical

35
36

Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1)(D)(i)).

Id. (citing Sec'y of the Interior,464 U.S. at 341).
Id. at 474 (citing N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
38
Id. (quoting Nevada v. Dep't of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
39
Id. The environmental impact statement discusses any adverse environmental effects
that cannot be avoided and alternatives to the proposed action. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (2006)).
40
d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (2008)).
41I d.
37
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habitat of the endangered species. 42 After the analysis, if an agency
determines that the action may affect the species or habitat, the agency is
required to consult the National Marine Fisheries Service or the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Services.4 3 But, if the agency determines that the action will
not result in any adverse impact to the species or habitat, the agency does
not have to consult with the NMFS or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Services."
D. The Substantive Theory of Standing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife4 5 sets out the Supreme Court's
modem standing test.4 6 For a petitioner to establish standing, that
petitioner must demonstrate: (1) a particularized injury occurred; (2) the
injury was caused by and is fairly traceable to the act challenged; and (3)
that the injury can be redressed by the court. 47 Injury is established when
a party demonstrates that it has suffered an injury that affects it in an
individual way.48 Additionally, an alleged injury must be actual or
imminent and not hypothetical. 49 Finally, although injuries must be
particular and not generally suffered, the Supreme Court clarified in FEC
v. Akins that standing can be established if a generalized harmed occurred
so long as the injury was concrete, not abstract.50 This distinction is
relevant in environmental injury cases, as a plaintiff does not have
standing when a general environmental harm occurs but will have standing
if the plaintiff can show injury due to that general environmental harm.5 1

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
43 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13-.14 (2009).
4 Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1447-48 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)).
45 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42

46See

4

id. at 560-61.

id.

48 Id. at

560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
50 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
st Fla. Aubudon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
49 Id. (quoting
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Traceability and causation rests on whether an injury can be fairly
traceable to the challenged action.5 2 In applying this test to an agency, the
plaintiff must show that the challenged acts of the agency will cause a
particularized injury to the plaintiff.5 Additionally, the more attenuated
the chain of causation, the less likely the link of injury will be established
between the agency and the plaintiff.54 Finally, when the plaintiff is not
the object of the government action, standing is more difficult to
establish. 5 In establishing causation, the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that a government action will lead a third party to act in a manner
that will cause injury.5 6
E. The ProceduralTheory of Standing
Lujan also articulated procedural standing requirements when
litigants are challenging an agency decision.5 7 A plaintiff has procedural
standing if they can show that an agency failed to abide by a procedural
requirement designed to protect a threatened, concrete interest.5 8 This is
accomplished by showing that not only did a defendant omit a procedural
requirement, but also that it was substantially probable that the procedural
requirement omitted will cause the essential injury to the plaintiff required
to assert standing. 59 Justice Scalia noted in Lujan that the procedural
theory of standing is perhaps easier to meet. 60

Id. (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n. 19 and Cal. Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped,
Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 825 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
53 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466,477 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) and Fla.
Aubudon Soc 'y,94 F.3d at 663).
54
Id. at 478 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-58).
5Id.
at 477 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562).
56
Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562).
s7 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8.
52

58 Id.

s9 Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (citing Fla.Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at
664-65, 667). Essential injury is the plaintiff's requirement to show that the injury was
not equally suffered.
6 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-78.
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F. Proceduraland Substantive Standing after Massachusetts
Prior to Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 standing jurisprudence
traditionally did not allow litigants to bring suit, seeking relief due to a
defendant's action, which has, or more importantly might, cause climate
change consequences.6 2 After Massachusetts, it appeared that climate
change litigants had precedent that allowed the possibility of citizen suits
to seek relief for climate change suits. 63
In Massachusetts, a particularized injury to the State of
Massachusetts was alleged to result in the rising of global sea levels
leading to the diminishment of the state's shoreline. 64 This case
represented a significant benchmark in environmental standing for two
reasons. First, states do not normally have standing to sue the federal
government on behalf of its citizens. 6 5 Additionally, as stated above,
standing is more difficult to establish when the plaintiff, here the State of
Massachusetts, is not the object of the government action.66 However,
Massachusetts articulated what has been interpreted as a "sovereign
exception," stating that a sovereign has standing to sue when the state is
suing for its individual interests because its individual interests are
harmed.
Second, although previous standing requirements articulated in
case law have not allowed climate change injury, primarily due to the
generalized nature of "injury" and the lack of causation, the Massachusetts
court found that all elements of standing were met. 68 In addressing the
scientific and ecological evidence presented, the Massachusetts court
found a chain of causation that resulted in an injury that could be
redressed; that greenhouse gas emissions can lead to the greenhouse
effect, which can lead to a rise in global temperatures, leading to a rise in
6' 549
62
63

6

U.S. 497 (2007).
See supra Part Ill.D for a discussion of Lujan's standing requirements.
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497.

Id. at 522.

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).
6 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).
67 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S at
497.
6
1 d. at 526.
65
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ocean levels and loss of state shoreline. 69 The standing interpretation of
Massachusetts has not been conclusively settled, as the Massachusetts'
dissent presented an alternate interpretation.
The dissenting opinion in Massachusetts articulated a traditional
theory of standing and did not "expand" the injury and causation scope. 70
First, the dissenting opinion stated that climate change is a harm to all of
humanity and therefore the plaintiffs injury is no different than any other
individual.7 ' Second, in discussing the majority's decision, the dissenting
opinion questioned whether injury had even occurred.7 2 As compared to
the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion felt that the loss in coastline
could not be conclusively and solely shown to be caused by climate
change.73
G. Whether a Claim is Ripe for Review
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner74 is the instructive case in
addressing whether a claim is ripe for review.
It gave the courts the
guiding principle that a court should determine if the issues are fit for
judicial-decision making and the hardship that could occur to parties if the
court withheld consideration. 76 Applying that principle, in the context of a
NEPA-based claim, a multiple-stage Leasing Program requires the court to
look at which stage of the Program a suit was brought.7 7 If a suit is
brought in a stage where a critical decision will occur which will lead to
an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources to an action that

6

1Id. at 504-05, 521.

See id. at 535-60 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting). The quotations
around expand
are purposeful, as the claim that the Massachusettsmajority opinion expanded the injury
and causation scope will be explored in the comment. See infra Part V.C.
Id. at 541.
72
1d. at 541-42.
70

73Id.

387 U.S. 136 (1967).
7s See id.
76 See id. at 148-49.
7 Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
74
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will affect the environment, then the suit is mature and ripe. 8 Therefore,
ripeness of a suit in multiple-stage Leasing Programs matures only when
the Program is at the stage where leases are issued.79
H. StandardofReview
The D.C. Circuit utilizes a "hybrid" standard of review when
analyzing whether a Leasing Program complies with OCSLA. 80 The
hybrid standard of review is a balancing of the substantial evidence and
the arbitrary and capricious tests. 8 First, findings of ascertainable fact are
examined under a substantial evidence test, which states that a
determination must be made with more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance of evidence. 82 Second, Interior's OCSLA interpretation
decisions are given deference so long as the decision is based off of a
permissible construction of the statute and therefore is not arbitrary and
capricious. 83 However, an agency action will fail in court if the action
does not effectuate Congress' intent, if the court determines that the
agency did not consider the relevant factors or if the court determines that
there was a clear error in judgment. 84
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Biological Diversity, Chief Judge Sentelle of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit delivered an opinion
dismissing a portion of the Petitioners' claims while remanding the case
on the merits of other claims. 8 5 The opinion followed a three-step analysis
78

Id. at 49 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977)).

79

id.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466,484 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
81 Watt, 668 F.2d at 1300.
82 Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 563 F.3d at 484 (citing FPL Energy Me. Hydro, L.L.C. v.
FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
81Id. (citing Watt, 668 F.2d at 1302-03).
8
Id. (citing Watt, 668 F.2d at 1302-03).
8
1Id. at 472.
80
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in determining the Petitioners' standing, ripeness, and merits of their

claims.8 6
A. Claims Examined Under a Standing Test
In examining each claim, the court first assessed whether the
Petitioners had standing.8 7 First, the court held that the Petitioners lacked
standing on their substantive climate change theory.88 Relying on its
interpretations of Massachusetts and Lujan, the court held that the
Petitioners failed the substantive test of standing because they did not
establish either the injury or causation element of standing.8 9 The court
held that the Petitioners' argument that the environment suffered an injury
does not meet the standing requirements but rather the party itself must
have suffered an injury.90 The court reasoned that the Petitioners did not
allege any particular injury and only stated that the Leasing Program
"may" affect climate change and the environment. 91 Additionally, the
Petitioners could not prove that their particular interest was any different
than the interests of the rest of the population. 92 Therefore, in examining
these elements, the court held that the Petitioners did not allege an injury
that would pass a standing analysis and that any alleged injury asserted
would be too generalized to establish standing. 93
Turning to the causation element, the court held that even if the
Petitioners would have been able to meet the injury prong, they still would
not have had standing because the Petitioners could not establish a causal
link between Interior's action, the Leasing Program approval, and the
Petitioners' injury. 94 In citing Allen v. Wright and Florida Audubon
86 Id. at 475.
Id at 475-76.
Id at 475.
89
1d. at 477-78 (construing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2009) and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
90
Id. at 478 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
91 Id.
92

id.

9

'Id. at 475-78.

94

Id. at 478.
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Society v. Bentsen, the court held that the petitioners' claim of causation
was too indirect to establish a link. 95 The court reasoned this by showing
the nature of the indirect link; that the Leasing Program will bring about
drilling, which will yield oil, which will then lead to an increase in oil
consumption, which will then cause carbon dioxide dispersement in the
air, and therefore cause climate change. 9 6
Once the court established that the Petitioner did not have a
substantive claim of standing, the court then turned to the procedural
theory of standing the Petitioners asserted. 97 In determining that the
Petitioners were able to show both that Interior omitted a procedural
requirement and that the procedural breach was substantially likely to
cause injury to the Petitioner, the court held that the Petitioners had
standing under a procedural theory to bring their OCSLA and NEPAbased claims. 98
B. Claims Examined Under a Ripeness Test

Next, the court turned to whether the NEPA-based claim was ripe
99 In holding that the NEPA claim was not ripe for review, the
review.
for
court turned to the nature of the Leasing Program's multiple stage
timing. 00 In addressing the timing of the Petitioners' suit and focusing on
the fact that Interior had only approved of the Leasing Program, the court
held that the Leasing Program had not reached a critical stage where an
irreversible commitment of resources that will effect the environment had
occurred.o10 Therefore, the court held that the Petitioners' NEPA-based
claim was not yet ripe.102
95

Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) and Fla. Audubon Soc'y v.
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
9 Id. at 478-79.
97
Id. at 479.
98

id.

9

Id. at 480.
0 Id
1o Id. The court used the Wyoming Outdoor Council test articulated in Wyoming
Council v. UnitedStates ForestService, 165 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Id.
Outdoor
102 id,
1
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Additionally, the court refuted the Petitioner's two chief arguments
against the conclusion that the NEPA claim was not yet ripe. First, the
Petitioners asserted that their harm in having to wait to bring a claim until
the actual leasing stage began would outweigh the harm to Interior. 0 3
The court reasoned that Interior, along with other agencies, actually
suffered a larger share of the harm by bringing the claim at the lease
approval stage because agencies safeguarding against this type of suit
during a pre-leasing time would essentially be required to create an
additional procedural requirement for segmented programs.' 04
Second, the court refuted the Petitioners' argument, taken from
portions of Ohio ForestryAss'n v. Sierra Club, that the NEPA claim could
not get any riper because NEPA claims may be complained of as soon as a
failure occurs. 0 5 The court held that the portion of Ohio Forestry the
Petitioners took their argument from was dicta.10 6 Moreover, the court felt
the Petitioners reached for too much in the Ohio Forestrycourt's holding,
as the holding only stated that a claim cannot get any riper than when a
violation occurred and does not address what constitutes the point when a
violation occurs. 0 7 Therefore, because Ohio Forestry does not dictate a
decision the court needs to abide by and Wyoming Outdoor Council states
that a NEPA obligation occurs only when the leasing stage commences,
the Petitioners' second argument also fails.
Third, the court looked to whether the ESA claim was ripe for
review. Here, the ESA ripeness claim focused on whether Interior's
approval of the Leasing Program may affect a list species or critical
habitat. In articulating the holding of North Slope Borough v. Andrus, the
court found that it should consider the ESA requirement in light of the
nature of the Leasing Program and therefore consider the requirement in
each particular leasing stage. 08 Therefore, the court held that the ESA

13Id.
105 Id
107
1os

at 481 (construing Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998)).

id.
Id. at 483 (construing N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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claim was not ripe for review, as the first leasing stage caused no harm to
a list species or critical habitat, and no subsequent stages have occurred.1 09
Finally, the court determined whether the OCSLA claims were ripe
for review.110 The court held that the claims were ripe for review, as they
concerned requirements that are implicated at the initial stage of the
Leasing Program."'
C. Remaining Claims Examined Under the Merits
Three claims, the OCSLA Climate Change claim, the OCSLA
Baseline Information claim, and the OCSLA National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration claim, survived the standing and ripeness
requirements and the court subsequently looked to the merits.112 First, the
court held that the Climate Change OCSLA claim fails because OCSLA
does not require Interior to consider the effects of consumption of oil and
gas due to the Leasing Program." 3 The court found that because the text
of OCSLA states Interior must consider the potential impact of oil and gas
exploration and production and not oil and gas consumption, the
Petitioners' argument is without merit.l14
Second, the court held that the Petitioners' OCSLA Baseline claim
failed because the Petitioners' interpretation of the OCSLA requirement
that baseline research be established, updated, and monitored was
erroneous." 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court again referenced the
text of OCSLA to state that such baseline research is required subsequent
to leasing and development, not during the approval stage." 6
Finally, the court found that the Petitioner's OCSLA NOAA claim
had merit and Interior's decision to solely rely upon the NOAA study was

109 Id.

" 0Id. at 484.
111Id.
12 Id. at 472, 483.

13Id. at 484.
114 id.
"s Id. at 486.
116

id.
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improper. " The court found that OCSLA mandates that Interior assess
the environmental sensitivity of different areas of the OCS, not just the
effect an oil spill will have on shorelines."' 8 Therefore, because Interior
erroneously limited the scope of its assessment, Interior failed to comply
with OCSLA balancing requirements, and on remand Interior is required
to conduct a more complete analysis, consistent with OCSLA standards."l 9
V. COMMENT

The most important implication of Chief Judge Sentelle's opinion
in BiologicalDiversity is what effect the case's standing analysis will have
on future climate change claims. BiologicalDiversity distinguished itself
from Massachusetts by discussing the inapplicability of the sovereign
exception used in Massachusetts. Additionally, Biological Diversity
defined the scope of Massachusetts. However, although this distinction
was warranted, subsequent cases should exercise caution in interpreting
Biological Diversity's discussion of Massachusetts. Specifically, two
discussions in Biological Diversity should be examined. First, although
the Petitioners did not appear to actually allege injury in Biological
Diversity, the opinion's analysis risks subsequent misinterpretation by
dismissing any prospective injury as being a generalized, and therefore not
actionable, injury. This is highlighted by a mysteriously worded passage
discussing harm within the opinion and its subsequent analysis. The
passage and subsequent analysis casts doubt as to whether Biological
Diversity would have followed generalized harm precedent set by Akins
and followed in the Massachusetts' majority.
Second, Biological
Diversity 's discussion of causation appears to not follow the
Massachusetts' majority and instead adheres to the arguments laid out in
the Massachusetts' lower court and Supreme Court dissent.

"7

Id. at 489.
Id. at 488.
* Id. at 489.
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A. Massachusetts' Lower CourtDissent
Written by Judge Sentelle, the author of the Biological Diversity
opinion, the Massachusetts' lower court's dissent would have held that the
State of Massachusetts did not have standing.120 Judge Sentelle first
addressed the injury prong in his analysis. Quoting Lujan, Judge Sentelle
asserted that when an individual's relief to a generalized harm no more
directly benefits the individual than society at large, the harm is not
considered an injury under a standing analysis.121 Applying this legal
principle to the facts, Judge Sentelle found that the emission of gases that
may cause climate change is harmful to humanity at large.1 22 Therefore,
the nature of the harm, regardless of whether injury occurred, foreclosed
the possibility of standing.
B. Massachusetts' Dissenting Opinion
In the Supreme Court, the Massachusetts' majority overturned the
lower court's decision and held that the State of Massachusetts had
standing to bring suit against the EPA.123 The dissenting opinion, written
by Chief Justice Roberts, again attacked the assertion that the State of
Massachusetts would have standing to bring suit.124 First, in addressing
the sovereign exception, Chief Justice Roberts countered the majority's
determination and stated that the majority gave the state special
solitude.1 25 Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the state was
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in judgment), rev'd 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Judge Sentelle's opinion
was a concurrence in judgment and dissent in part. Id. This is relevant because Judge
Sentelle not only agreed with the lower court's majority opinion that the EPA exercised
proper rulemaking discretion, he went further to state that the majority's opinion was
inevitably correct because the State of Massachusetts did not have standing anyway. See
id.
120

121id.

122 Id. at

60.
Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 498.
124Id. at 535.
25
' Id. at 536.

123
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given a relaxed standing requirement.126 Second, Chief Justice Roberts
praised the lower court's dissent, written by Judge Sentelle, in discussing
the type of harm that occurred.127 Using Judge Sentelle's language, Chief
Justice Roberts argued that a danger to humanity at large was not a
particularized injury.128 The only redress for the plaintiffs in a climate
change situation, Justice Roberts held, was literally to change the
atmosphere.129 Since the harm was general and the potential remedy is the
same for all of society, Justice Roberts reasoned that the injury is not
particularized and therefore not a standing injury. 130
Additionally, the dissent expanded upon Judge Sentelle's criticism
to argue that the evidence brought forth did not prove any actual or
imminent loss of shoreline.' ' In questioning the state's assertions, the
dissent argued that the state only hypothetically showed a claimed ten to
twenty centimeters of shoreline had disappeared.132 Therefore, the dissent
argued that no actual injury had occurred. In shifting from an actual injury
inquiry to whether the injury may be imminent, Justice Roberts reasoned
that the injury asserted was also not imminent, as the rise in shoreline was
predicted to be seventy centimeters in the next ninety years.' 33 Justice
Roberts focused on the timeframe of ninety years as a barrier for the harm
to be imminent.' 3 4
C. Analyzing the Massachusetts' DissentingOpinions
Justice Roberts created a susceptible framework that the dissent
used to analyze the sovereign exception. By asserting that special
solicitude was given to the state, the dissent attempted to show that the
126 d.
127 See id. at 541.
128 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in judgment), rev'd 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
129 Id.
130id.
31

132

Id. at 541-42.
d.

i3 1 Id. at 542.
i3 Id.
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majority weakened the standing analysis to allow the state standing.135
However, in two different places in the dissent, one of which is one
sentence after an assertion that the standing analysis for the majority was
weakened, Justice Roberts discussed the traditional three-step standing
analysis the majority used.136 Therefore, Justice Roberts' claim is not that
the standing analysis was weakened specifically due to the unique nature
of the State of Massachusetts, but that the subsequent standing analysis for
the majority was inadequate to find standing and therefore the majority
must have allowed a sovereign exception.137 This is simply inconsistent
with the sovereign exception defined by the majority and found in
previous case law.' 3 8
The sovereign exception was granted as a
procedural right to the State of Massachusetts to protect its own interests,
not the interests of its citizens from the operation of federal statutes.' 39
Protecting the latter right is prohibited but protecting the former is not.140
Therefore, the sovereign exception, as the majority refers to and the
dissent mischaracterizes, is not an exception to the standing analysis but a
protection of the state's procedural right.
Second, the Massachusetts' dissenting opinions correctly asserted

that some sort of injury must occur in order to have standing. However,
the analysis of what type of injury is required either ignored or attempted
to distinguish previous case law.14 1 Specifically, Akins stands for the
proposition that when a right is conferred to someone, even if everyone
subsequently is harmed due to an action, that generalized harm can still

i" Id. at 540.
136id

See id.
See id at 518-19. The Court cited Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), Alfred S.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 607 (1982), and Georgiav. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) to articulate the parameters of the sovereign exception.
Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 518-19.
139 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (distinguishing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
137
13

447 (1923)).
140 id

141See,

e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). Additionally, although widely a
discredited case, United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatoryAgency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), provides precedent for generalized harm suits.
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confer standing so long as the harm is concrete and not abstract.142 The
majority opinion recognized the precedent Akins set in order to reach its
holding.143 However, the dissenting opinions of both the lower courts and
the Supreme Court chose to not even discuss Akins.144 The dissenting
opinions provided no discussion of the possibility that a generalized harm
could still be an injury for standing purposes and instead asserted that
generalized harms preclude standing.14
Finally, the Massachusetts' Supreme Court majority and dissenting
opinion disagreed on whether the causation element could be met.' 4 6
While both opinions generally agreed on the chain of causation, that
vehicle emissions can lead to global warming which can cause the sea
levels to rise due to the polar caps melting, both opinions simply disagreed
on whether or not the chain was too attenuated.147
D. Applying the Massachusetts' Opinions'Analysis
to Biological Diversity
Biological Diversity correctly finds that no actual injury was found
because the Petitioners never actually alleged injury.14 8 But, Biological
Diversity analyzes whether injury would have been found anyway and
concludes that the harm was generalized and therefore would preclude
injury standing.149 This analysis follows the Massachusetts' dissenting
opinions but appears to ignore the Massachusetts' majority and Akins. The
following passage in BiologicalDiversity raises this question.

142 Akins,

524 U.S. at 24.
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.
1" See id. at 535-60; Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59-82 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
145 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-60; Massachusetts,415 F.3d at 59-82.
146 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523, 542.
147 id
148 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
149 Id. at 477.
143
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Moreover, to the extent that Petitioners allege that the
Leasing Program caused any actual harm to any territory,
this harm is limited to areas of the OCS-areas that are
owned by the federal government, not by a state or Native
American tribe.
Aside from these allegations of
generalized harm brought about by climate change,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that climate change
would directly cause any diminution of Point Hope's
territory any more than anywhere else. Accordingly,
without this necessary element being present, we find that
Massachusetts's limited holding does not extend to the
standing analysis in this case.' 50
Asserting that the Petitioners did not allege harm, the passage goes further
to state that even if there was harm found, the harm occurred in areas that
the Petitioners did not own.15 1 But in looking to precedent, it is readily
shown that simply owning an area is not a prerequisite to showing that
injury occurred. Numerous cases have held that injury occurs when the
plaintiffs are deprived from access to various entities due to the
defendant's action. 152 The important test is whether actual injury
occurred, not whether actual injury occurred to an entity that the plaintiff
must own.
Throughout Biological Diversity, the opinion sought separation
between the case's facts and decision and that of Massachusetts. In
attempting to distinguish Massachusetts in order to show that the
Biological Diversity facts do not afford it Massachusetts' standing, the
court explicitly stated that Massachusetts stands only for the limited
proposition that when a harm is widely shared, a sovereign has standing to
sue when that sovereign's interests, separate from the citizens it
represents, are harmed.1 53 But a fair reading of Massachusetts shows that
the case does not stand only for that limited proposition.
150Id
15
152
153

Id

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 476-77.
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Biological Diversity's standing analysis is an application of the
Massachusetts' dissents, not the majority opinion. Like the dissenting
opinions, one of which was written by Judge Sentelle, BiologicalDiversity
characterizes Massachusetts as an illustrative case of both a sovereign
exception and an easing of the standing analysis to allow the otherwise
inactionable generalized harm. As the Massachusetts' majority and Akins
have shown, a generalized harm does not preclude standing so long as that
harm is concrete.
Additionally, using the Massachusetts' Supreme Court dissent,
Biological Diversity also attacks the Petitioners' causation argument and
concludes that they have not established an injury fairly traceable to the
challenged action.154 In stating that the Petitioners cannot show that
Interior's acts will cause an actual injury, the court does not follow the
precedent that the Massachusetts' majority set in allowing climate change
harm that does not have direct causation. Specifically, Biological
Diversity asserts that too many attenuated steps have occurred and
therefore a link cannot be established.' 5 5 The court describes numerous
steps to attempt to show that the claim is attenuated, such as stating that
the Leasing Program will bring about drilling, which will bring about
more oil, which will then be consumed.156
However, as the
Massachusetts' majority opinion has shown, the presence of multiple steps
to an injury does not preclude a showing of causation. The Biological
Diversity opinion appears to replace the words "fairly traceable" in its
analysis with "really easily traceable."
E. Why Biological Diversity's InterpretationofMassachusetts Matters
Even if the Petitioners had an alleged injury in Biological
Diversity, it is not clear that the majority's analysis would have conferred
standing. Biological Diversity's interpretation of Massachusetts matters
because it generally provides an example of how courts will analyze future
" Id. at 478.
5 Id. (noting that the less indirect the claim, the less likely the plaintiff will be able to
establish a link (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984))).
156Id.
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standing claims that involve a harm caused by climate change.
Specifically, the interpretation matters for three reasons.
First, jurisdiction to review agency decisions is usually vested in
the D.C. Circuit.1 7 Therefore, BiologicalDiversity's interpretation of the
Massachusetts' standing analysis creates precedent for other D.C. Circuit
cases to follow. Second, Biological Diversity's attempt to define and
frame the scope of the Massachusetts' holding risks creating precedent
that actually follows the Massachusetts' dissenting opinions'
interpretation rather than the Supreme Court Massachusetts' majority.
Future litigation cases could be decided using Biological Diversity's
determination that a petitioner needs land in order to claim harm, a chain
of causation can be too attenuated if there are more than a few steps
between the action and the harm, and a sovereign entity exception alters
the normal injury standing analysis. All of these interpretations are either
erroneous or do not recognize previous precedent. Third, and most
important, Biological Diversity 's analysis points to a standing
jurisprudence that does not recognize generalized harms as being able to
survive a standing analysis. An interpretation against allowing standing
for generalized harm claims is in direct contradiction to the injury analysis
articulated in Massachusetts and Akins. Subsequently, if the new
precedent Biological Diversity created holds, concrete, widely shared
harms will no longer allow standing and the analysis will depart from
Supreme Court precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION

At its most ambitious interpretation, BiologicalDiversity limits the
scope of Massachusetts by showing that Massachusetts is an exception,
not the new rule. However, this note has articulated a "middle ground"
argument. Although Biological Diversity 's discussion of a generalized
injury is susceptible on the grounds that it seems to choose to follow the
Massachusetts' dissent rather than Supreme Court precedent, Biological
Diversity correctly decided that the Petitioner's inability to show actual
is7 John G. Roberts Jr., What Makes the D.C. CircuitDiferent? A HistoricalView, 92
VA. L. REv. 375, 389 (2006).
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injury forecloses standing. The standing analysis is the most important
legacy Biological Diversity leaves because the ability of individuals to
challenge government programs that may allow global warming lies in
whether or not standing jurisprudence will move toward a more expansive
or intrusive interpretation. If standing analysis moves towards a liberal
interpretation of Massachusetts,standing considerations will no longer bar
global warming litigants from the courthouse door; anyone seeking to
bring suit on behalf of the environment will be able to withstand a
standing challenge, and a claim of injury will no longer be a prerequisite
to surviving a standing analysis. However, if a standing analysis moves
away from the liberal interpretation of Massachusetts to the standards and
spirit articulated in BiologicalDiversity,BiologicalDiversity will continue
to serve as precedent to show that in order for a petitioner to bring climate
change claims that Massachusetts now appears to allow, actual, fairly
easily traceable, non-generalized injury needs to be alleged. 58
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For example, see Comer v. Murphy USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) and Native
Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) for cases
that used BiologicalDiversity to articulate that not showing an alleged injury precludes
standing.
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